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Concept Pluralism, Direct Perception, 
and the Fragility of Presence
Alva Noë
This paper has three main aims. First, I criticize intellectualism in the philosophy
of mind and I outline an alternative to intellectualism that I call Concept Plural-
ism. Second, I seek to unify the sensorimotor or enactive approach to perception
and  perceptual  consciousness  developed  in  O’Regan &  Noë (2001)  and  Noë
(2004, 2012), with an account of understanding concepts. The proposal here—that
concepts and sensorimotor skills are species of a common genus, that they are
kinds of skills of access—is meant to offer an extension of the earlier account of
perception. Finally, I describe a phenomenon—fragility—that has been poorly un-
derstood, but whose correct analysis is critical for progress in the theory of mind
(both perception and cognition).
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1 Introduction
The present study takes its starting point from
the enactive or sensorimotor, or, as I now prefer
to call it, the actionist approach to perception
and perceptual consciousness (O’Regan &  Noë
2001;  Noë 2004,  2012). Actionism is the thesis
that perception is the activity of exploring the
environment making use of knowledge of sensor-
imotor  contingencies.  Sensorimotor  contingen-
cies are understood to be patterns of depend-
ence of sensory change on movement. The pro-
posal, then, is that we make use of this know-
ledge of the way our own movement gives rise
to  sensory change  to  explore  the  world.  This
knowledge-based or skilful activity is perceiving.
We characterized the relevant kind of know-
ledge as knowledge precisely in order to mark the
continuity between perception and “higher”, more
intellectual  kinds  of  cognition  such  as  thought
and  planning  (O’Regan &  Noë 2001).  At  the
same time, we were quick to characterize the rel-
evant forms of knowledge as practical, non-pro-
positional, as implicit, or as “skill”, precisely in
order to avoid over-intellectualizing perception.
In Action in Perception (Noë 2004, Ch. 6), I
defended the view that perception requires  the
mastery and exercise of concepts. In doing so, I
took myself to be lowering the bar on what it is
to have a concept, rather than raising the bar on
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what it is to be a perceiver. It was always my
view that the resulting account was one in which
understanding (mastery and use of concepts, in-
cluding sensorimotor skills) and perception (ex-
ploration of the environment drawing on a variety
of skills, including concepts, as conventionally un-
derstood, and also sensorimotor skills) worked to-
gether in human and animal mental life. As I put
it later, “understanding” and “perception” arrive
at the party together (Noë 2012). 
Although actionism places great emphasis in
the  importance  of  movement,  action,  and  the
body for the theory of perception, on the claim
that perceiving is an activity, and on the proposi-
tion that perception is not a representation-build-
ing activity, it was never the intention of the view
to  deny  the  critical  role  of  understanding  and
knowledge. The point, rather, was to offer a uni-
fied  account  of  perception,  consciousness,
thought, and action. But the details were not en-
tirely worked out. Knowledge, skill,  ability, and
understanding were not carefully defined, and the
precise relation between the account of perception
and that  of  conceptual  understanding  was  not
spelled out in detail. I try to rectify that here. 
My basic strategy in this paper is as follows.
In part I, I offer an extended discussion of what I
call intellectualism. I define the view, criticize it,
and show how even critics of the view tend to
share many of its presuppositions. In part II, I try
to offer an alternative to intellectualism, namely
concept pluralism, which builds upon the action-
ist  conception of  concepts as  “skills  of  access”.
Concepts,  I  propose,  should  be  thought  of  as
techniques for enabling access to what there is. In
this way—the details will become clear later on—
I offer a way of thinking about concepts that is
unified with the basic elements of the earlier the-
ory of perception. 
One caveat: I don’t take up the issue of an-
imal experience and cognition in this paper, even
though it is directly relevant to the topic. 
I
2 Modes of understanding
Kant (1791) said that concepts are predicates of
possible judgement. That’s what concepts are.
They are creatures of  judgement. He also be-
lieved that concepts play a basic role in cogni-
tion. They organize the data of sense. Without
concepts,  sensory  experience  would  be  empty
sensation;  without  sensory  influx,  there’d  be
nothing  for  concepts  to  organize.  For  Kant,
judgement  gives  the  basic  form of  experience
(Erfahrung). 
Frege (1891) said that concepts are func-
tions from objects to truth-values. In this he ap-
peared  to  break  with  Kant.  Concepts  have
nothing to do with judgement or with our cog-
nitive  organization.  They  are  before  all  that.
This  is  in  tune with Frege’s  well-known anti-
psychologism, according to which grasping, un-
derstanding, judging, and communicating are of
no  relevance  to  logic  or  ontology.1 But  Frege
doesn’t actually sever the link between concepts
and  judgement;  he  only  frames  it  differently.
Concepts figure in what is judged; they belong
to  judgeable content. So Frege preserves Kant’s
link  to  judgement,  but  in  a  de-psychologized
version.2
Frege’s  anti-psychologism  gets  him  into
trouble.3 The fact that concepts are not them-
selves psychological, in the sense of being ideas
or  associations  or  feelings,  doesn’t  mean that
they  are  not  tied  to  understanding  or  judge-
ment, for nothing forces us to think of under-
standing and judgement as psychological in that
sense.  At the same time,  the claim that con-
cepts are “third-realm” entities gives little sub-
stance to the idea that they are, in the relevant
sense,  objective.  Finally,  if  concepts  are  some
sort of occult abstracta, then it isn’t at all clear
how we can grasp them. And surely, whatever
concepts are, it is the case that we can grasp
them.
I’ll return to this set of issues later. But
for  now let  us agree that  for  both Kant and
Frege,  concepts  are  tied  to  judgement,  where
this means something like: they are tied to cat-
egorizing,  to  explicit  reasoning,  to  subsuming
objects under concepts. Each of these thinkers
offers an account of concepts, or of the under-
1 See, for example, Frege’s “Thoughts“, (1918–1919).
2 Not that I mean to suggest that it is right to think of Kant as actu-
ally offering a psychological account. But it might look this way from
Frege’s perspective.
3 As both Dummett (1973) and Baker & Hacker (1984) have noticed. 
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standing of concepts, in what I’ll call the mode
of  judgement.  According  to  Kant  and  Frege,
grasp or understanding of concepts finds its nat-
ural, true expression in judgement. 
This paper takes its start from the obser-
vation  that  there  would  appear  to  be  other
modes of conceptual activity, other ways for un-
derstanding (for concepts) to find expression in
our  lives.  At  least  on  the  face  it,  judgement
would not seem to be the only mode of concep-
tual understanding. 
Take, for example,  perceptual understand-
ing, or what we might call  understanding con-
cepts in the perceptual mode. Consider reading.
It is difficult to tell, looking at the entrance to
the Taj Mahal, which bits of squiggle are mere
ornament,  and  which  are  writing  in  Classical
Arabic. You can have this experience, it is avail-
able to you, only if you are not fluent in Clas-
sical Arabic,  or in this style of  Arabic script.
This marks the spot of the basic phenomenon:
there would seem to be a mode of understand-
ing  that  is  perceptual  in  nature.  It  is  im-
possible, as a psychological matter, to see mean-
ingful text as a mere squiggle. For the one who
knows, for the one who can, meaningful words
just show up.
Compare this  with the case of  a scholar
studying Renaissance paintings in which writing
is  shown embroidered  into  the  robes  of  magi
and other fabulous figures. Are these scripts in
a  familiar  language,  or  could  they  be  marks
from  a  forgotten  one?  Or  are  they  pseudo-
scripts?  How do you decide? A keen problem
and  one  that  affords  opportunity,  for  it  de-
mands  reasoning,  explicit  categorization,  and
judgement.4
But nothing like that seems to be going on
when you are reading. And the point is general:
it operates at the level of our everyday seeing.
It is difficult, maybe even impossible—psycholo-
gically speaking—to see familiar kinds of things
around us as mere things. We always see them
as this or that. 
I don’t mean that when we see, we repres-
ent the things we really see around us as this or
that, by bringing them under the relevant con-
4 For a discussion of this fascinating topic, see A. Nagel (2011). 
cepts,  by  categorizing  them,  as  it  were,  in
judgement. The point rather is that the things
we  see,  the  things  around  us,  are  familiar,
known, comprehended, understood, and recog-
nized,  from  the  very  outset.  Concepts  are
geared in before we are even in a position to ask
what  something  is  or  to  make  a  judgement
about it.5 
So we have here a distinct way in which
concepts, or the understanding, can be put to
use outside the setting of judgement. Specific-
ally, as I’ve said, this is an example of the de-
ployment of concepts in the perceptual mode or,
more simply, perceptual understanding.
Note, in saying perception is a non-judge-
mental mode of understanding, I don’t mean to
deny that  there  might  be  an interdependence
between  the  judgemental  and  the  perceptual
modes. Maybe only one who can judge can per-
ceive and precisely because perception enables
judgement. And maybe it  is  only of  one who
can have perceptual  experience that we could
ever say that he or she is in a position to judge
about anything.6 My point is that, on the face
of it, judging is one thing, and perceiving an-
other, and yet they are both ways of exercising
the understanding.
There are other modes, as well. 
Concepts also get deployed in what I call
the  active mode;  understanding,  that  is,  can
find  expression,  immediately,  in  what  we  do.
There is such a thing as  practical understand-
ing. And what makes the relevant understand-
ing  practical  is  not  that  it  is  an  exercise  in
judgement on, as it happens, practical matters.
What makes it practical, in my view, is that it
is the gearing in or putting to work of one’s un-
derstanding in the absence of  any call  for,  or
even space for, reflection or judgement.
The dog walker’s  knowledge of  dogs,  for
example, is put to work in the way he or she
adopts a gait that suits the dog and encourages
or  permits  it  to  accomplish  its  sniffy,  doggy
business; and so also in the way the owner spon-
taneously shortens the leash as another dog ap-
proaches; it is exhibited, even, we might say, in
5 As Heidegger (1927) would have put it, the things we encounter are
always already familiar.
6 I return to this issue of the unity of concepts in section 6 below.
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the  cool  she  keeps  when  the  two  dogs  begin
barking and straining at their leashes. Without
a word, in the absence of deliberation, or expli-
cit  thought,  the owner knowingly engages the
nature of dogs.7
And there may be still other kinds of un-
derstanding,  other  styles of  conceptuality.  For
example, there is also perhaps what we could
call the emotional mode, or maybe it would be
better to say the personal, or even interpersonal
mode.  Tears,  feeling,  injury,  but also  posture,
standing distance to others, navigating in a so-
cial environment, can all show a highly refined
attunement  to  situation,  relationship,  status,
goals, tasks, and so on. It takes understanding
to  do  all  this,  even  though  we  rarely  try  to
make  this  understanding  explicit  and  even
though, very probably, we cannot do this, even
in ideal circumstances. Let us say that in this
kind of responsive engagement with our social
worlds we display understanding.8
To summarize: there is a case to be made
for the existence of at least three, maybe four,
distinct modes of understanding. There is  the
judgemental  mode,  the  perceptual  mode,  and
the active mode, and perhaps also the personal
mode.
3 Intellectualism vs. the intellectualist 
insight
I have proposed that there are at least three or
four  distinct  modes  of  understanding.  I  now
turn to the familiar thought that among these
varieties of expression of conceptual understand-
ing, only one—the judgemental mode—is genu-
ine. The other modes, according to this idea—
that is, the perceptual, the active, the personal
7 This example is from Stephen Mulhall (1986). 
8 With this last example we move beyond description to the suggestion
of an argument. The thought is that the relevant forms of under-
standing couldn’t be underwritten by judgement, since we are not
able,  as  a  general  rule,  to frame the  needed judgements.  Indeed,
something like this line of thought is already suggested in the way
I’ve sketched the perceptual and active modes above. Recall the cel-
ebrated case of Oliver Sacks (1970): a man can’t recognize the item
before him as a glove; his powers of judgement are fine—he describes
what he sees as a self-enclosed piece of fabric with five outpouchings
—and he knows what a glove is. The case is illustrative because it
brings out that it is less the fact that he can’t recognize the glove,
and more the very fact that he needs to think about it all,  that
brings home the thought that in our normal life there is no room for
that sort of deliberation.
—are expressive of understanding only derivat-
ively, thanks to the fact that they are guided or
controlled, from outside as it were, by true un-
derstanding in the judgemental mode. 
I will call this view intellectualism. Intel-
lectualism, as I am defining it, is the view that
one modality of conceptual expression is basic,
namely,  the judgemental,  and that  the others
are domains where understanding finds expres-
sion only derivatively.9 
Plato and Descartes  seemed to have  be-
lieved  something  like  this.  For  them,  a  mere
sensation rises to the level of perception, and a
mere movement to the level of action, only if it
is subject to guidance by reason. The soul is di-
vided against itself and it achieves integration
only when it is controlled in the right way from
above. 
Intellectualism  is  probably  the  establish-
ment view in cognitive science. When you see
the Pole Star, for example, as  Fodor &  Pyly-
shyn (1981) insist, you represent whatever it is
that you really see—a pattern of irradiation of
the retina, perhaps—as the Pole Star. To sup-
pose otherwise is to suppose that vision could
be, as Gibson (1986) had claimed, a direct pick
up of what there is around us. But Pole Star-
hood, like the third dimension, is not something
that gets projected onto the retina. The what-
ness  of  things,  their  nature,  no less  than the
third-dimension itself, are not, strictly speaking,
visible. We need judgement, the application of
concepts (in  this  case  perhaps  automatic  and
implicit) in the building-up of mental represent-
ations, to get something like the world into our
experience.10
Jason  Stanley,  in  a  series  of  writings
(Stanley &  Williamson 2001;  Stanley 2011;
Stanley &  Krakauer 2013), defends what I am
calling intellectualism. You perform a skilful ac-
9 Intellectualism can be defined differently. For a variety of approaches
to problems in this vicinity, see Bengson & Moffett (2011).
10 This was David Marr’s (1982) view. The content of visual experience
is given in a 2.5D sketch, that is, in a depiction of what is given in
the projection of the world onto the retina. It is only in so far as vis-
ion yields knowledge that it goes beyond what is given in this inter-
mediate-level representation and gives rise to a fully conceptual 3D
model. But for Marr, and for his recent advocates (Prinz 2013), al-
though we live in the world of the 3D sketch, our experience is con-
fined  to  the  intermediate-level  representation.  And  crucially,  for
these thinkers, you don’t need concepts or understanding at the in-
termediate level. You just need optics.
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tion,  according  to  Stanley (2011),  only  when
your action flows from your knowledge of true
propositions. He elaborates: 
[t]here are all sorts of automatic mechan-
isms that operate in a genuine sense sub-
personally. The human (and animal) capa-
city for skilled action is based upon these
mechanisms. What makes an action an ex-
ercise of skill, rather than mere reflex, is
the fact that it is guided by the intellec-
tual apprehension of truths. (Stanley 2011,
p. 174)
Is intellectualism right? Should we be intellectu-
alists?
It is important that we notice, right away,
that intellectualism is right about something. It
does  justice  to  the  fact  that  there  is  under-
standing,  and  there  is  conceptuality,  at  work
wherever  we  think  and  perceive  and  act  and
talk, as we have been considering. Conceptual-
ity, understanding, and knowledge pervade not
only the mental, but our lives and our being.
Certainly,  it  is  in  evidence  wherever  we  can
speak of agency. Stanley insists (in the quota-
tion above) that we can only speak of skilful ac-
tion where there is understanding at work. He
perhaps ought to have said that we can only
speak of action at all, as opposed to mere reflex,
or mere movement, where there is also under-
standing.
The question I would like us to consider is
this: do we need intellectualism to secure this
undoubted intellectualist insight, as I will dub
the recognition of  the pervasiveness  of  under-
standing in  our perceptual,  active,  as  well  as
emotional lives? It’s crucial that we notice the
distance between the insight and the thesis. It’s
one thing to say that there is understanding at
work in perception and action, and another to
think that what makes this true is that percep-
tion and action are grounded on acts of judge-
ment. Do we need to think that what guaran-
tees and secures the involvement of understand-
ing is the fact that our seeings, doings, and feel-
ings are guided by judgements?
There are, right off the bat, two obvious
grounds for suspicion regarding the intellectual-
ist thesis. For one thing, intellectualism at least
threatens to obscure the differences to which I
have been directing our attention among what
at least appear to be authentically distinct ways
of exercising one’s knowledge and understand-
ing. And so, it seems, it gets things wrong. See-
ing and acting and dynamically reacting, most
of the time at least, don’t look or feel anything
like bringing objects  under concepts in judge-
ment.
For another, intellectualism smacks of the
arbitrary. Couldn’t we maintain that perception
is  the  basic  form  of  understanding  and  that
judgement, even in cases of pure reasoning and
mathematics, rests on a kind of perceptual in-
sight? Or that it is understanding in the active
mode that is truly basic? Judgement itself de-
pends on the mastery and exercise of conceptual
capacities which are in the first instance prac-
tical. You need to know how to use concepts,
after all, in order to use them in judgement. 
In  any  case,  let  us  ask  again:  are  there
reasons to endorse intellectualism? Why think
that judgement is the primary and singular au-
thentic modality of real understanding? Why be
an intellectualist?
4 Troubles with intellectualism
Stanley’s writings (Stanley & Williamson 2001;
Stanley 2011; Stanley & Krakauer 2013) on the
topic are suggestive. However, he seems to mis-
take evidence in favour of the insight (that un-
derstanding is present in perception and action,
as well as in the setting of explicit deliberative
thought) with support for intellectualism itself
(for the view that judgement governs action and
perception). And, on top of that, he may com-
mit the fallacy of conceiving the whole genus on
the  model  of  one  of  its  species;  like  thinking
that every dog is a cat because, well, they are
mammals, or that seeing is a way of touching
because, after all, they are both forms of per-
ception. In this case it is the fallacy of thinking
that  knowing how must be a form of  knowing
that because, after all, it is form of knowledge.
Let’s turn to this last point first, briefly.
Stanley (2011) notices that we use “to know”
both for  propositional  knowledge and also for
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practical  knowledge  (know-how).  Contrary  to
what  he  suggests,  however,  there  are  cognate
languages  where  this  is  not  the case.  For  ex-
ample, we don’t express knowing how in Ger-
man using the same verb that we use to express
propositional knowledge (Stanley 2011, pp. 36-
37). We use können, which means can; we don’t
use wissen (as in wissen wie).
But in any case, the more important point
is,  so what? How dispositive are facts like this
supposed to be? It is common ground, I would
say, that know-how is a form of knowledge, an
achievement of understanding. The question is
whether it is a form of knowledge of the same
type  as  propositional  knowledge,  the  sort  of
knowledge  that  gets  expressed  in  judgement.
Crucially, all the evidence in the world that it is
a form of knowledge doesn’t add up to evidence
that it is propositional knowledge.
Now, as a matter of  fact,  we know that
knowing  how  to  do  something  is  not merely
knowing that a proposition is true, for any pro-
position you might care to think up. For know-
ing how to do something implies that you have
the ability to do it (and vice versa), whereas the
corresponding  propositional  knowledge  has  no
such practical entailments. 
Stanley would deny this (Stanley & Willi-
amson 2001; Stanley 2011). You can know how
to perform a stunt but be unable to perform it
(because  you’ve  been  injured,  say);  so,  he
claims, possession of know-how cannot be equi-
valent  to  possession  of  an  actual  ability.  But
this is  unpersuasive. Of course it  is  true that
you can know how to do something even though
you are unable to do it. But this is because your
being  unable  to  do  it  is  not,  in  the  relevant
sense, evidence that you can’t do it! Consider:
you can’t swim if there’s no water, even though
you  can  swim.  You  can  swim  but  you  can’t
swim.  Far  from  showing  that  know-how  and
ability part ways, this sort of consideration re-
minds us that they move along the same rails.
So knowing how to do something isn’t pos-
session  of  propositional  knowledge:  it  doesn’t
consist in being in a position to make certain
judgements.  This  is  a point that  Stanley and
Williamson accept, if  only implicitly,  for  they
provide a different analysis of the cases precisely
to account for the critical link to action in the
case  of  know-how. Knowing how to do some-
thing, on their view, consists in grasping a true
proposition, yes, but it consists in grasping it in
a  distinctively  and  irreducibly  practical  way
(making  use  of  practical  modes  of  presenta-
tion).11 
Again, it is worth noticing that to deny, as
I do, that knowing how to do something con-
sists in knowing the truth of a proposition, is
not to deny that, as a matter of fact, knowing
how to do something may put you in a position
to make certain judgements, or may require you
to appreciate the truth of certain propositions. 
This brings us to the first point above: the
confusion of evidence for the insight with evid-
ence for the thesis. I am assuming that know-
how, like propositional knowledge, is a form of
knowledge. This common ground is already se-
cured  by  the  insight:  our  understanding,  our
knowledge  of  concepts,  is  put  to use  in  both
cases.  So we can readily agree with  Snowdon
(2004), cited approvingly by Stanley (Stanley &
Williamson 2001), that knowing how and know-
ing that go together—that where you have one,
you have the other. In general, as Snowdon ob-
serves, if you know how to do something—say,
how to get home from here—then you’ll know
that all sorts of things are true, such as, for ex-
ample, that you need to turn left here, that you
aren’t already home, etc. And vice versa. Know-
ing how and knowing that, in this sense, com-
mingle and cooperate. These considerations are
adduced by Stanley, and by Snowdon, I think,
to suggest that  Ryle was mistaken in believing
that the propositional and the practical are dis-
joint and disconnected (1949); in fact they oper-
ate together and in support of each other. This
is an important point and one I endorse. And
this is exactly what one should expect given the
intellectualist  insight.  After  all,  understanding
operates in both spheres: the practical and the
judgemental  or  propositional.  Crucially,  how-
ever, the fact that the practical and the propos-
11 Stanley (2011)  offers  a  different  account  from that  developed  in
Stanley &  Williamson (2001).  The  former  is  framed in  terms  of
modal parameters governing the interpretation of the relevant sen-
tences. Although he insists that know-how does not entail ability, he
admits that attributions of know-how exhibit more or less the same
sort of modality as ascriptions of dispositions and abilities.
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itional mutually entail each other in this sort of
way lends no support to the intellectualist idea
that one of these, the propositional, is founda-
tional in respect of the other; indeed, it weighs
against that very idea. Why press on and insist
on this thesis when, it would seem, the insight
on  its  own  is  enough  to  capture  the  phe-
nomenon at hand? 
Stanley’s motivations seem fairly clear. He
wants to break with the idea that propositional
knowledge is detached and, as he puts it, beha-
viourally  inert.  He  wants  to  insist  that  it’s
wrongheaded to think that athletes and clowns
and  craftspeople  are  skilful  zombies,  whereas
philosophers and mathematicians and physicists
are  intellectual  workers  whose  actions  exhibit
authentic brain-power. It may be, even, that he
thinks this is a point of political significance.
Intellectualism  isn’t  necessary  to  secure
any of  this,  however.  The insight has already
done that. 
In fact,  intellectualism, as Stanley devel-
ops  it,  threatens  to distort  the  nature  of  the
cognitive achievements that are put to work in
our practical, perceptual, and personal engage-
ments. This comes out in the discussion of skill.
Stanley &  Krakauer (2013)  defend  Aristotle’s
claim  (from  Metaphysics 1046b)  that  we  can
only speak of skilful action, as opposed to mere
habit, or brute capacities, where we can speak
of rational control of action, and also where we
can speak of teaching, learning, practicing, get-
ting better, or achieving expertise. They defend
Aristotle’s claim that it is a mark of skilfulness,
that  you  can  voluntarily  choose  to  perform
what you can do skilfully badly.
This  last  point  seems  unlikely.  I  can’t
choose not to understand what you say, or to
see writing as mere squiggles, or words as com-
posed of bits I need painstakingly to sound or
spell out. A guitarist cannot choose to experi-
ence the instrument in his hands as strange or
unfamiliar. At best, maybe, I can pretend I am
unable to do these things.
Is  this  because  talking  and  reading  and
playing guitar are not really skilful at all, that
they are mere habits outside the range of ra-
tional  control?  Hardly!  They’re  expressions  of
skilful competence, rational understanding and
knowledge  if  anything  is.  The  mistake  is  to
think that a performance is only rational if con-
trol is exerted in the mode of judgement, as if
from outside. The understanding that is put to
work in our talk and play, as in our thought, is
native  to  these  various  styles  of  engagements
themselves.
Stanley and Krakauer make a lot of the
demand  that  skill  depends  on  knowledge  of
facts. It’s worth noticing, yet again, that insist-
ing, as I do, that skilfullness does not consist in
the  exercise  of  concepts  in  the  judgemental
mode  does not entail that there can be skilful-
ness  in  the  absence  of  the  ability  to  exercise
them in that mode. It may be, as a matter of
fact—this is related to the Snowdon point above
—that only someone who is sensitive to all sorts
of facts, for example, about how something is
done,  will  in  fact  know  how  to  do  it.  This
doesn’t  show  that  knowing  how  is  a  kind  of
knowledge of the facts. It shows rather that our
distinct  conceptual  capacities  may be interde-
pendent. 
Stanley and Krakauer try to draw a line
between true  skills,  which are,  in  their  sense,
governed  by  rationality,  and  others—for  ex-
ample perceptual and linguistic skills—that are
too basic, or too simple to qualify as skills in
the fuller rational sense.12 
One problem with this suggestion is that
it is not so easy to draw a sharp line between
skills and supposedly brute abilities. Take col-
our vision, for example, which is innate in hu-
mans. Despite this,  it  turns out that children
find it very difficult to recognize and discrimin-
ate  colours  long  after  they’ve  mastered  the
names of  familiar  objects,  people,  games,  etc.
As Akins (unpublished manuscript) has argued,
this is probably because colours are not simple,
as  our phenomenology,  or  rather,  our conven-
tional wisdom about our phenomenology, leads
us erroneously to believe. Getting blue or yellow
or red is  to develop a sensitivity to suites  of
constancies  and  variations—to  ecological  vari-
ation in what I have called colour-critical condi-
12 Stanley & Krakauer (2013, p. 5) write: “[b]ut at some point, all such
knowledge will rest on knowledge of basic actions, such as grasping
an object or lifting one’s arm. These activities are not skills; they are
not acquired by or improved upon by raining in adult  life.  Their
manifestation is nevertheless under our voluntary control.”
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tions—that takes time and learning, and allows
for criticism and reflection. Is colour vision ba-
sic? Or is it skilful? It may be both.
This is not a special case. Because seeing
is saturated with understanding, it is very hard
to find features of our ability that are not mod-
ulated by knowledge and context. Granted, the
ability to discriminate line-gratings of different
densities is fixed, at its limit, by the resolving
powers of the eyes; yet our discriminations are
likely to be sensitive to task and motivation, to
attention and distraction—that is, very broadly,
to our engagement with the meaningful world.
So where does skill stop and brute ability be-
gin? I am skeptical that learnability, teachabil-
ity, or rational control provide an interesting or
valuable demarcation. The most basic reason for
this is that perceiving is never merely registra-
tion. It is a matter of knowledgable access (Noë
2004, 2012).
There is a second important issue as well.
Consider language. Linguistic misunderstanding
doesn’t stop language in its tracks, ejecting you
and sending you back to the grammar, written,
as it were in advance, by those responsible for
setting  up  the  language.  Rather,  coping  with
misunderstanding—dealing  with  not  getting
how someone is using words, or how we should
use them, or with not knowing how to use them
—is one of language’s familiar settings. We ad-
judicate and teach and learn and improve and
criticize and define and formalize and evaluate
within language, not from outside it. Language,
contrary to the claims of Chomskyan linguistics,
is not a rule-governed activity. It is a rule-using
activity. And we make up the rules as we need
them and for our own purposes. This may be
controversial. But here’s why I insist on it: ac-
cording to the logician’s or the linguist’s picture
of  language, first  you assign values to primit-
ives, then you set up rules governing the con-
struction of well-formed formulas. If you think
of language this way, then it looks like you need
judgement—the application of rules to cases—
to secure the meaningfulness of what would oth-
erwise be mere marks and noises. But we don’t
need judgement—we don’t need understanding
in the judgemental  mode—to secure  meaning.
We don’t need guidance from the outside.
The opposition between habit and skill is
a false one; and it is a mistake to think that
what marks the opposition is that habit is be-
low or before understanding whereas skill is the
deliberate exercise of understanding. 
5 Troubles with anti-intellectualism
Some critics of intellectualism argue that per-
ception cannot be conceptual, because if percep-
tion were conceptual, then perception would be
a form of judgement. But the idea that percep-
tion  is  judgement  over-intellectualizes  percep-
tion.13
This is  how I  understand  Gareth Evan’s
(1982) argument in connection with the Müller-
Lyer illusion. You can experience the two lines
in the Müller-Lyer illusion as different in length,
even when you know, and so have not the even
the weakest inclination to deny, that the lines
are the same in length. The visual experience is
one thing, and judgement another; hence exper-
ience is not conceptual.
Now, this  is  an  example  of  an apparent
disagreement between what you know to be the
case (judgement) and how things look (experi-
ence). Things look precisely the way you know
they are not. Experience and the judgement are
in conflict. This shows, I would have thought,
that experience, and the corresponding content,
share the same kind of content. The fact that
they are in apparent conflict  shows that they
are  not  somehow  incommensurable.  So  if  the
one is conceptual, then so is the other. 
But  more  important,  for  our  discussion
here, is that Evans seems to assume that con-
cepts can only be in play if they are applied in
judgement. Since experience is not judgement,
there  is  no  way for  concepts  to gear  in.  But
that’s to accept the basic claim of the intellec-
tualist—judgement is the only way for concepts
to get into the act—not to challenge it.
So Evans’ argument against the idea that
perceptual  experience  is  conceptual—what  we
can think of as Evans’s anti-intellectualism—ac-
tually  takes  what  I  am calling  intellectualism
13 See Noë (2004, Ch. 6) for detailed engagement with the issue of the
conceptuality of perception and the relation between my own posi-
tion and that of John McDowell. 
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for granted. It takes for granted that there is
only one genuine and legitimate mode of exer-
cise  of  conceptual  understanding,  namely  the
judgemental. 
Hubert Dreyfus (e.g.,  2013) is responsible
for a widely-influential criticism of intellectual-
ism that is crypto-intellectualist in just this way.
Reasons, principles, and explicit knowledge
guide  perception  and  activity,  according  to
Dreyfus, but only in the case of the novice. The
expert, in contrast, is  one who is engaged, in
the flow. The expert, having mastered the rules
and the concepts, has no further use for them.
The expert is able to respond to the solicita-
tions of situation and environment with no need
for conscious thought or deliberate judgement.
A favourite example is that of the lighten-
ing  chess  player.  There  is  literally  no  time,
claims Dreyfus, for the chess player to analyse
the situation and decide how to move. Moves
are made in a flash. To suppose that the move
is guided by reasons or judgement is to fall prey
to a  myth of the mental, according to which a
mind-faculty,  a  faculty  of  judgement,  say,  ac-
companies  our  doings  and  is  responsible  for
them  being  expressive  of  competence,  intelli-
gence, and understanding. For Dreyfus this idea
is a dead giveaway of a distinct type of intellec-
tualist psychologism. Yes, Dreyfus grants, if you
ask the expert afterwards, why he or she made
this move and not that one, he can give you a
reason. But we have no more ground to suppose
the reason was in operation before the player
switched into the intellectual mode in response
to the question than we do to suppose that the
refrigerator light is always on because it is on
whenever you open the fridge to look.
According  to  Dreyfus,  understanding  or
reason operate only if there are explicit acts of
rule-following,  or  judgement,  that  accompany,
or  even  precede,  every  act.  But  why  believe
that?  The baseball  player  doesn’t  need to  be
thinking about the rules for it to be the case
that what he does is subject to them and is car-
ried out, so to speak, in their light. The rules
are  there—in  the  form  of  umpires  and  rule
books, and also dictionaries and courts of law,
and earnest disagreement among participants—
and we have access to them as need arises. The
fact that we can use them, and that we care
about their correct use, is all that is needed for
it to be the case that we act under their influ-
ence. The influence is not causal. It is normat-
ive. 
Dreyfus  goes  further  and  insists  that
whether  or  not  it  is  always  legitimate  to  de-
mand that the phronesis, as he calls the expert,
invoking Aristotle, justifies his or her actions, it
will not in general be possible for him or her to
do so. You can’t make explicit the myriad rules
governing how we stand or react or explore or
decide because, as a matter of fact, there are no
such general rules. There is nothing to be made
explicit.  At best the chess master  is  likely to
point to the situation on the board and exclaim,
look! This situation requires this move!
But  why is  not  this  exactly  the  kind of
reply  that  is  required?  Recall  Wittgenstein’s
(1953, §88) example of “Stand over there!” This
can be a perfectly precise command, as exact as
rationality can require, even when it is not the
case that one can specify, to the millimetre, say,
where it is one is supposed to stand. For certain
purposes,  in  certain  contexts,  one  may  need
more  precision.  But  in  other  contexts  the  de-
mand for precision on the order of millimetres
would be unreasonable. And so my thought here
is that it is to set too high a standard on what it
would be to have a reason for acting to demand
that one can frame it independently of the situ-
ation one is in. It is precisely an over-intellectual-
ized conception of what it would be to have a
reason, or to make use of a rule, to suppose that
rules  and reasons need to be context-free and
situation-independent, known in advance and ap-
plied,  as  it  were,  from  outside  one’s  engaged
play14—just as it would be to over-intellectualize
the intellect in general to suppose that concepts
only gear in in the setting of judgement.
Here’s  the  point:  the  use of  rules  them-
selves—which for Dreyfus is the hallmark of the
detached attitude of  the  intellect—is  itself  an
activity that admits  of  mastery and expertise
and so also flow. And so we cannot insist that
rule-use marks the  boundary between engage-
ment and detachment. 
14 See  McDowell (1994).  His  discussion  of  demonstrative  senses  and
demonstrative concepts aims at just this point.
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But once we allow that rules are used, and
reasons  proffered,  from the  standpoint  of  our
engagement—from the inside—, then we need
not fear that we have committed ourselves to an
over-intellectualized conception of what it is to
be engaged, just because we allow that we un-
derstand and can reflect on what we are doing. 
Notice again that Dreyfus’s picture—a pic-
ture he may take over from  Heidegger (1927)
and Merleau-Ponty (1945)—only counts as evid-
ence against the idea that concepts and reasons
and rules gear into perception and skilled action
if  we suppose that  the intellectualist  is  right,
that there is only one way for understanding to
get into the act—namely, in the form of explicit
deliberate judgement.
And notice that this way of rejecting intel-
lectualism—on the part of Dreyfus, and other
existential phenomenologists, and perhaps also
Evans—pays a high price. For it must reject the
idea  that  understanding and reason have  any
place at all outside the range of explicit deliber-
ative reason, and so it has to give up the intel-
lectualist’s insight, namely that in our engaged,
perceptual, and active lives, even when we are
experts, even when we are skilled, our perform-
ance gives expression to knowledge, intelligence,
and understanding. By accepting the intellectu-
alist  thesis  that  judgement  alone  is  the  only
true way for concepts to gear in, Dreyfus and
co.  feel  they are compelled to reject the idea
that our lives as a whole, beyond the confines of
deliberate exercise of reason and understanding,
can be, or are, at one with our intellects.
What existential phenomenology may find
difficult to appreciate—at least in Dreyfus’s ver-
sion of the position—is that conflict, disagree-
ment,  and disturbance  of  flow are  themselves
business-as-usual; they are normal moments in
the way that even the expert carries on. We saw
this in the language case. Expertise is not im-
munity; if anything, it is an evolved opportunity
for new forms of vulnerability. Engagement is,
as I shall put it, always manifestly fragile. That
is, the liability to slip up, to get things wrong,
is a built into the nature of the undertaking—of
any undertaking. To go wrong is not, as a gen-
eral rule,  to stop playing the game—it is  not
the game’s abeyance—it is rather a moment in
the development of play. But let’s go back to
language. We don’t  stop communicating when
we fail to understand each other. At least that
is not usually the case. Misunderstanding is an
opportunity  for  more  communication.  Clarify-
ing, reformulating, trying again, like criticism,
are things we use language to do. The fragility
is intrinsic  and manifest.  It  doesn’t  mark out
the game’s limits. It marks one of its modalities.
I  stated earlier that understanding in the
active and perceptual modes leaves no room for
the  application  of  understanding  in  the  judge-
mental mode. I suggested this was a reason for
thinking that judgement can’t be operating be-
hind the scenes when we perceive and act. But we
can amend this now in light of our consideration
of fragility. It is internal to the very character of
our perceptual and active involvements that they
are liable, not so much to breakdown, in Dreyfus’s
sense, as to error, confusion, and other stutter-
steps that require precisely that one now  think
about what one is seeing and what one is doing.
Judgement and thought can, in this sense,  live
cheek-by-jowl with perception and action without,
therefore, getting in their way.
In any case, Dreyfus’s criticism of intellec-
tualism fails. But it does so precisely because he
fails to break with the over-intellectualized con-
ception of the intellect at the heart of intellectu-
alism.  Dreyfus’s  anti-intellectualism  fails  be-
cause intellectualism fails. It is, in reality, a spe-
cies of intellectualism. Neither Dreyfus, nor his
would-be opponent, can do justice to the ways
in  which  understanding  operates  outside  the
narrow domain of explicit reasoning. Both sides
fail to accommodate the phenomenon of fragil-
ity. 
II
6 Concept pluralism: A genuine 
alternative to intellectualism
So let  us now turn our attention to the pro-
spects for framing a true alternative to intellec-
tualism. What would such an alternative look
like? 
A  genuine  alternative  to  intellectualism
will be pluralist in that it will reckon that there
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are  different  legitimate  and  non-derivative
modes of understanding, and so it will hold fast
to the intellectualist’s insight that understand-
ing is in play everywhere in our lives even as it
rejects the intellectualist thesis.
One resource for such a pluralism is  Wit-
tgenstein (1953). Wittgenstein proposed that a
concept is a technique, and that understanding,
therefore, is a form of mastery, akin to an abil-
ity.  An important  fact  about  abilities  is  that
they can be exercised in a multiplicity of ways. I
can exercise my understanding of what a house
is by building one, looking at one, painting one,
living in one, talking about one, or buying one.
So, from this standpoint, there is nothing more
surprising  about  the  fact  that  my  knowledge
can find expression in what I do, as well as in
my knowledge of a proposition, than there is in
the fact that my ability to read gets exercised
both when I read a novel and also when I blush
at the words on the bathroom wall. 
This idea also helps us explain the unity of
understanding.  If  concepts  can  be  applied  in
walking the dog as well is in writing a treatise
about  dogs,  what  is  the  connection  between
these  two  self-standing  and  non-derivative
modes of exercise of something that, surely, is a
single conceptual capacity: an understanding of
the concept  dog? What gives unity to this un-
derstanding?
The idea that understanding a concept is
mastery of a technique, a mastery that has mul-
tiple, distinct, context-sensitive ways of finding
expression, helps here. One way to express un-
derstanding of  dog is  to talk and write about
dogs. Another way is to be able to spot dogs on
the basis of their appearance. Still another is to
work or play comfortably with dogs. And the
list goes on and on. We put our singular under-
standing of what dogs are to work in these dif-
ferent ways, and the understanding consists in
the ability to do (more or less) all of that.
We are  now in  a  position  to  appreciate
that the claim that perception and action are,
with judgement, non-derivative, original modes
of  understanding  does  not  entail  that  these
modes are independent of each other. The idea
that the unity of a concept is a matter of unity-
in-ability  helps  bring  this  out.  The  fact  that
perception isn’t beholden to judgement for its
conceptuality doesn’t mean that there could be
perception  in  the  absence  of  capacities  for
judgement. After all, typically, you can’t be said
to know a concept if you can’t apply it in nor-
mal perceptual settings. Can you know what a
tomato is if you are incapable of any active or
perceptual engagement with tomatoes? 
But we should also be careful. In so far as
our concepts have unproblematic unity, then, on
this Wittgensteinian view, this is because they
are  exercises  of  common  abilities—abilities
which are, of their nature, such as to admit a
genuine  multiplicity  of  expressions.  But  the
unity of our concepts is not something that we
can always take for granted. 
Is  there  one concept  of  dog,  or  several,
brought to life in different situations and sub-
cultures  at  different  times,  for  different  pur-
poses? Is there unity or just fragmentation? Is
this a shared understanding? These are import-
ant questions,  not for philosophy, particularly,
but for culture. Look at the changes that have
taken place in our thinking about  matter over
the last few hundred years. Or, to give a differ-
ent kind of example, about gender. We have no
choice but to work it out as we go along.
And crucially, there is no standpoint out-
side our thinking, talking, writing, persuading,
imposing,  regulating,  prescribing  and also  de-
scribing, from which these questions can be ad-
judicated.  This  doesn’t  make the existence  of
dogs a matter of social construction. (Of course,
dogs are, literally, bred and so constructed by
us.) No, surely dogs have a mind-independent
nature. But it does mean that it is hard and
creative and unending work to bring that reality
into focus in our shared thought, talk, percep-
tion, and activity.
There  is  no  standpoint  outside  our
thoughtful practices from which to ask after our
own  concepts.  For  our  concepts  are  our  own
tools and techniques. This is where Frege went
wrong. He seems to have thought that the only
way to achieve  objectivity—that is, sharability,
articulability, and lawfulness—was by supposing
concepts were out there, indifferent to how we
grasp or understand them. In fact, they super-
vene on our grasping, negotiating, communicat-
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ive activity. Frege made no allowance for fragil-
ity.
7 Concepts are skills of access
But can we say more than just that concepts
are abilities? Abilities to do what? Well, we’ve
already said: to talk and see and use and judge,
and so on. 
But I think we can do better. To do so, I
draw on the  actionist  approach to  perception
developed in earlier work (Noë 2004,  2012). To
begin to organise an answer, consider two famil-
iar  facts  about visual  perception.  The first  is
that, as Euclid noticed, when a solid opaque ob-
ject is seen, it is never seen in its entirety at
once.  Things  always  have  hidden  parts.  The
second is that the visible world is cluttered with
all manner of stuff. Things get in the way, the
view is interrupted, occlusion is the norm. 
And yet, despite these striking limitations,
we don’t experience the world as cut off from
us, inaccessible to vision, blocked from percep-
tion. The partial, fragmentary, and perspective-
bound  character  of  our  visual  access  to  the
world is not a limit on what we see, a marking
off of our liability to blindness; it is, rather, the
very  manner  of  our  seeing.  This  is  fragility
again.
Not seeing through the solid and opaque,
as if it were transparent, is not a perceptual
failing but rather an accomplishment. And re-
latedly:  we  belong  to  the  cluttered  environ-
ment ourselves. We are not confined to what
is projected to a point. We explore. And it is
that exploring, that doing, that is the seeing.
The seeing is not the occurrence of a picture
or representation in the head; it is, rather, the
securing  of  comprehending  access,  thanks  to
our possession of a specific repertoire of skills,
to what there is. The generic modality of the
way the world shows up in perception is not
as represented,  but rather  as accessible (as I
argue in Noë 2012). This is why our inability
to see things from all sides at once, or to ex-
perience a thing’s colour in all possible light-
ing conditions at once, is  no obstacle to the
presence of whole objects and colours in our
experience. 
The immediate environment is present in
visual perception, not because it projects to the
eyes, but because the person, by means of the
use of his or her eyes as well as other forms of
movement and negotiation, has access to that to
environment.  Presence  is  availability,  and  its
modalities—visual as opposed to tactual, for ex-
ample—are fixed by the things we need to do,
the  negotiations,  to  bring  and  keep  what  is
there in reach.  Wittgenstein,  in  the  Tractatus
(1921), said that the eye is a limit of the visual
field. But this is wrong: the adjustments of the
eye, the need to adjust the eye, difficulties in
adjusting the eye, are given in the way we see.
Wittgenstein’s  point,  I  suppose,  was  that  the
eye doesn’t see itself seeing (unless you look in a
mirror). But here’s a different model: seeing is
like what an outfielder does. To say that the eye
is not in the visual field is a bit like saying that
the body of the outfielder is not in the field of
play. But in fact the eye and the head and the
hand and the arm and the glove are all in the
field of play. And what we call fielding the play
is  precisely a temporally extended transaction
in that whole environment. And the basis of the
environment’s availability to this or that modal-
ity  of  exploration,  beyond  the  fact  that  it  is
there,  is  our possession of  the skills,  abilities,
and capacities to secure our access to it. The
occluded portions of the things we see are there
for us, present to us, thanks to our skilful abil-
ity to move and bring them into view. Percep-
tion is fragile.
John Campbell, writing in a related con-
text (2002), has said that we shouldn’t think of
the brain as representing the world; we should
think of it as making the adjustments that, as
he puts it, keep the pane of glass between you
and the world clean and clear, as if it were con-
tinuously vulnerable to becoming opaque.
My thought  is  that  we (not  our  brains)
need continuously to make adjustments to keep
the world in view, and to maintain our access to
the world around us. 
But  I  add:  the  character  of  the  world’s
presence itself is precisely a function not only of
what there is, but of what we know how to do,
and what we do, and what we must always of
necessity stand ready to do, just in case, to pre-
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serve our access. You need to squint and peer
and  adjust  to  see  things  far  away;  and  this
makes a difference to how those things show up.
This is one reason why it is a mistake to
suppose that we think of the adjustments that
belong to the ways we bring the world into fo-
cus as the brain’s work. No, it is our work, even
if most of it is low-level, unattended, and done
automatically. For it is this work that gives ex-
perience the quality that it has.
The scene is present for us in the manner
of a field of play. This is a fragile presence. Its
presence is not given to us alone thanks to what
might happen in our brains,  thanks to neural
events triggered by optical events. Its presence
is achieved thanks to what we know how to do.
The basis of our skilful access to the world is,
precisely, our possession of skills of access.
And this,  finally,  is  what I propose con-
cepts are. They are skills of access, or rather, a
species of such. They are not so much devices
by  which  we  make  the  world  intelligible,  as
much as they are the techniques by which we
secure our contact with the world, in whatever
modality. From this point of view, concepts like
dog and matter are of a piece with other skills of
access such as the not-quite-articulable sensor-
imotor skills we skilfully deploy as we navigate
the scene with our thinking bodies. 
From  this  standpoint,  it  is  worth  em-
phasizing that there is no theoretically inter-
esting  cleavage  between  seeing  and  thinking
(as  already  argued  in  Noë 2012).  Seeing  is
thoughtful and thought is perceptual at least
in so far is it is, like seeing, a skilful negoti-
ation with what there is, as just another mod-
ality  of  our  environment-involving  transac-
tions. Presence, after all, is always in a modal-
ity—that  is,  it  is  always  dependant  on  our
repertoire of skills. And it is always a matter
of  degree.  The hidden portions of the things
we see  show up for us, as does the space be-
hind our head, and even spaces further afield.
We have access—skill-based, partial, perspect-
ive-bound, and fragmentary—to it all.
Perception and thought, from the actionist
perspective,  differ  as  sight  and  touch  differ.
They are different styles of access to the world
around us. 
8 We use concepts to take hold of things,
not to represent them
Let us come back to the more particular line of
investigation that has been our concern.
The intellectualist is quite right that in so
far as seeing is expressive of understanding, this
is because we bring concepts to bear in our see-
ing. But the intellectualist is mistaken in hold-
ing that this is because we categorize what we
see, in the mode of judgement, by applying con-
cepts.  It  is  rather  that  we see  with concepts.
Concepts are techniques by which we take hold
and secure access. Their job is not to represent
what  is  there;  their  job  is  to  enable  what  is
there  to  be  present  to  us.  You can’t  see  the
laser-projector if you don’t know what a laser-
projector is. Your possession of the concept is a
condition on the laser-projector’s showing up for
you.  It  is  the  ability  that  lets  you encounter
what is in fact there.
Back to the example of text: your grasp of
the relevant concepts enables  you to read (to
see what is there). Not because it gives you the
resources  to  interpret  or  decode  (although  it
does give you that). But because knowledge lets
what  might  otherwise  be  unseen  come  into
view. Knowledge can also, correspondingly, dis-
able us. Your reading knowledge, for example,
can make it difficult or even impossible to see
the squiggles, the “mere marks”, which are also
always there whenever you read.
And so across the board: we don’t apply
concepts in judgement to what we see in order
to represent things; our possession of the con-
cepts is what enables us to make contact with
them  themselves.  We  see  with  our  concepts.
They  are  themselves  techniques  or  means  for
handling what there is. Think of the concept in
perception not as a category, or a representa-
tion, but a way of  directly picking up what is
there (to re-use and rehabilitate  Gibson’s  1986
idea). 
And so also for the active modality. My
understanding gets expressed in what I  do and
it gets expressed directly—for example, I exer-
cise  my  knowledge  of  teacups  in  the  way I
handle this cup; I grasp the cup with my hands,
and  also  with  my  understanding.  My  under-
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standing gets put to work in the fact that I am
able to do this, in the fact that I know how to
do it. 
Understanding,  I  would  urge,  is  put  to
work, in these doings, directly. We don’t need to
suppose an action is skilful or knowledgeable or
expressive  of  understanding  only  when  it  is
guided,  as  it  were  from without,  by  proposi-
tional  knowledge—as  if  the  understanding
couldn’t inform our practical knowledge and our
action directly. 
And we are now finally in a position to
understand why this  is  the case:  for  then we
would be owed an account of how understand-
ing is put to work in judgement. And here, we
are  just  thrown back on  what  we can  do to
bring what is there for us into focus, to achieve
its presence.
9 Conclusion: The significance of 
fragility
The world shows up for us in perception and
thought, but it has a fragile presence. It shows
up in very much in the same way that what a
person means shows up for us when we are in
conversation,  to  return  to  the  language  ex-
ample.  Misunderstanding,  outright  failure  to
understand, are always manifestly live possibil-
ities. It isn’t only solid opaque objects that fail
to  reveal  themselves  in  their  totality  to  the
single glance. What we are given, always, is an
opportunity or affordance for further effort, en-
gagement,  negotiation,  and skilful  transaction.
The world is present to thought and perception
not  as  a  represented  totality—an idea  in  our
minds,  a representation in our brains—but as
the place in which we find ourselves, where we
live, where we work. The world is a big place,
and so there is a lot for us to do if we are to se-
cure our footing on its slippery grounds. But a
slippery ground is still a ground, and we need
to secure our footing.
Presence—in  thought  and  experience—is
fragile,  in  other  words.  Philosophy  has  been
strangely resistant to fragility.  Fragility is  not
fallibility. The point about fragility is that it is
manifest. An object’s colour shows up for us as
something with hidden aspects; it presents itself
to us as something that is always on the cusp of
variation, always ready to change with the least
alteration  in  our  perspective  or  in  the  condi-
tions of viewing. A colour, no less than a solid
object, has hidden aspects. We don’t experience
these aspects as isolated atoms—as if we were
confined to what the camera sees. What we see,
what we experience, outstrips anything that can
be understood in  optical  terms alone.  For we
see, we experience, and we also think about, a
world that manifestly goes beyond what can be
taken in a glance. Our skills—our understand-
ing, to use the term that has organised so much
of this discussion—gives us access to what there
is. 
That access is achieved, but not once and
for  all.  It  is  not  as  though  we  consume  the
world  in  encountering  it  so  that  now we can
make  do  with  what  is  inside  us.  Access  is  a
work in process. Presence is fragile, manifestly
so; but it is robust.
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